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The main purpose of the complaint in a civil action is to put the
defendant on notice that she is being sued because of her involvement in
a specific transaction or a series of transactions.1 As such, the liberal sys-
tem of pleading created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
"Rules") requires that a complaint only provide "a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and does
not require that a complaint provide specific facts.2
Regardless of the clear language found in Rule 8(a)(2), many judges,
in contravention of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, require civil
rights plaintiffs to plead facts supporting their allegations of intentional
discrimination.3 These requirements of factual support are often called
heightened pleading requirements.
Due to the fact that proof of intentional discrimination often rests in
the hands of the alleged discriminator, requirements of facts can sound
the death knell for even the most meritorious of claims. This possibility
becomes all the more likely when contact between the discriminator and
the victim is limited to one brief transaction; as opposed to the ongoing
relationship that is paradigmatic of certain types of discrimination, like
workplace discrimination.
Some scholars have noted substantive law, procedural law, and legal
culture combine to vindicate or defeat rights.4 I would modify this asser-
tion by positing that the substantive law, procedural law, legal culture, and
real-world context combine to define the extent of our substantive rights.
In this Note, I explore the interaction of: heightened pleading require-
ments; substantive civil rights laws; and, a type of discrimination that
usually involves a single, often brief, transaction between a discriminator
and a victim-discrimination in the marketplace.
The problem of discrimination in the marketplace is a very real
problem for people of color. Through heightened pleading requirements,
1. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
2. FED. R. CIrv. P 8(a)(2).
3. See infra notes 12, 76-95, 111, 124, 138, 141 and accompanying text.
4. Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration
of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C.L. REv. 211,219 (1992).
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courts have made it nearly impossible to seek remedy under the very fed-
eral civil rights laws that are supposed to guard against discrimination in
the marketplace. This point was made abundantly clear to me when my
clinic' represented an individual who we believed to have been detained
and falsely accused of shoplifting because she was Black.We filed a com-
plaint on her behalf alleging, among other things, that the defendants had
violated her right to enter into contractual relations under § 42 U.S.C.
1981 and to purchase personal property under § 42 U.S.C. 1982.
Unfortunately for our client, we appeared before a judge who be-
lieved that heightened pleading requirements should be imposed in civil
rights cases.The judge acknowledged that fact requirements in complaints
create vague standards.The lack of a bright-line rule means that what one
judge might find sufficient, another might not. This inconsistency is par-
ticularly problematic when discrimination is subtle and when the line
between discriminatory behavior and legal behavior is vague.
We had alleged facts from which we believed one could infer a dis-
criminatory intent. 6 But for our judge, our client's complaint was
insufficient because it did not allege that the store's employees said some-
thing like "you must leave the premises because you're African
American."7 I argued that this standard of factual pleading was particularly
impractical in the context of marketplace discrimination and that this
"procedural" requirement eviscerated the substance of % 1981 and 1982:
MR. GRAVES: Just think about what that standard means.
Under the standard of having had specific facts of "you're
out of here because you're African American" a store or its
employees could decide that they want to target members
of racial minority groups, that they could harass these peo-
ple, they could tell them to leave their store, and that their
business is no longer valued there. As long as they don't ex-
plicitly tell the defendant what they're doing, as long as they
don't use any racial epithets, that person not only doesn't
have a cause of action in a Federal or State Civil Rights
5. I was a member of the Community Legal Services chnic atYale Law School for
two years. The clinic held itself out to all people in the New Haven community who
could not afford legal representation. As such, the matters which our clinic handled ranged
from assisting clients with obtaining benefits to filing civil rights suits in federal and state
court. Our clients could contact us either through our weekly outreach program or
through our intake program.
6. Brief for Plaintiff at 2-3, Dabre v. Filene's Dep't Store, CV 99-0066429 S, 2000
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1964 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 29, 2000) (on file with the Michigan
Journal of Race & Law).
7. Transcript of Oct. 10, 2000 at 3-4, Dabre v. Filene's Dep't Store, CV 99-006429 S,
2000 Conn. Super LEXIS 1964 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 29, 2000) (on file with the Michi-
gan Journal of Race & Law).
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Law, but that person isn't even entitled to proceed to dis-
8
covery on the matter.
The judge acknowledged that this critique was "well put "' 9 but un-
der precedent from the Second Circuit he dismissed the civil rights
claims the next day.10
Given the sweeping language of % 1981 and 1982, it cannot be that
sellers of goods can engage in intentional discrimination, so long as they
make relatively minor attempts to cover it up. By exploring the interac-
tion between substantive law, procedural law, legal culture, and real-world
context, I seek to demonstrate that judges cannot offer any legal or prac-
tical justification for heightened pleading requirements in % 1981 and
1982 actions.Through my argument, I reach the conclusion that §5 1981
and 1982 plaintiffs must be given the same opportunity to litigate their
claims that virtually all other plaintiff; are given. While this conclusion
might seem basic, it is currently being ignored in many courtrooms across
this country." The overwhelming majority of literature in the field makes
the case against heightened pleading requirements by arguing that these
requirements violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 2 The impro-
priety of heightened pleading requirements under the Federal Rules,
however, is not the final deduction in an argument against heightened
pleading requirements; it is a starting point. Once we understand that
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id.
10. Order of Aug. 22, 2000 at 1, Dabre v. Filene's Dep't Store, CV 99-0066429 S,
2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1964 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 29, 2000) (on file with the Michi-
gan Journal of Race & Law).
11. E.g., Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F3d 329, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 2001
U.S. LEXIS 5530 (Oct. 1, 2001) (dismissing §5 1981 and 1983 complaint for failing to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the complaint did not allege facts
to support discrimination); Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F2d 646,
649 (9th Cir. 1984) (" 'Conclusionary allegations, unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected
as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.'" (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Sherman v.Yakahi, 549 F2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977)); White v. Florida Highway
Patrol, 928 F Supp. 1153, 1156 (M.D. Fla. 1996) ("In a civil rights action, more than mere
conclusory allegations are required; a complaint will be dismissed where allegations are
vague and conclusory")
12. E.g., Richard Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 433, 439-40 (1986) (describing the pleading requirements of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as exhibiting an intentionally liberal pleading ethos);
Yoichiro Hamabe, Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:A Catego-
rization Approach, 15 CAMPBELL L. Rav. 119, 205 (1993) (suggesting that application of
heightened pleading standards by the Federal Judiciary is contrary to the Federal Rules);
Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation:A Golden Anniversary View of
Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
67 N.C. L. RI. 1023, 1037 (1989) (arguing that heightened pleading requirements would
violate special pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 and general
pleading requirements of rule 8).
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heightened pleading requirements violate the Rules, we can ask why
judges continue to impose them. We can, thus, attack the principles un-
derlying judges' decisions to impose heightened pleading requirements.
In Part One, I take the first step in this argument by exploring the
substantive rights guaranteed by % 1981 and 1982, demonstrating how
the courts have emasculated these rights. In Part Two, I explore how
heightened pleading requirements violate the Rules, and how these "pro-
cedural" requirements can undermine the substantive rights of
meritorious claimants. In Part Three, I present the traditional arguments
advanced for heightened pleading requirements, and show that these ar-
guments are not supported by current political realities. Finally, in Part
Four, I argue that the Supreme Court should strike down the practice of
imposing heightened pleading requirements not only because they violate
the Rules, but also because they do not reflect the needs of victims of
discrimination.
I. SUBSTANCE:THE GOALS OF % 1981 AND 1982
AND THEIR BURDENS OF PROOF
In order to understand how courts have eviscerated the rights guar-
anteed under % 1981 and 1982 actions by imposing heightened pleading
requirements, it is necessary to explore the purpose of the statutes and
how courts have interpreted the rights that they guarantee.
A. The Historical Purpose of 5§ 1981 and 1982
Section 1981 guarantees that all persons in the United States shall
have the same right to make and enforce contracts as White citizens. 13
Section 1982 guarantees that all citizens will have the same right to pur-
chase personal property as White citizens.
14
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1991) reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
[WIhite citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1982(1978) reads:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens thereof to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
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These statutes were initially passed as part of the Civil Rights Act
(the "Act") in 1866 to abolish the Black Codes, which had been used to
frustrate the purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment."5 The Act was
subsequently reenacted in 1870.16 Many legislators viewed the rights
embodied in the Act as being so fundamental that they wanted to
incorporate them into the organic law; these legislators supported the
Fourteenth Amendment primarily because they viewed it as adopting the
guaranties of the Civil Rights Act.1 7 These statutes were supposed to carry
into effect the goals of the Act by ensuring that a person whose civil
rights have been violated may recover damages or injunctive relief.18
Looking at these statutes more closely, one can see that on their face,
they ensure broad rights. Section 1981 protects individuals at all stages of
the contractual life: from the initial offer, to acceptance, and through
post-formation. 9 This type of protection means that once a private ser-
vice advertises and offers a good or service to the general public, that
good or service must be offered on an equal basis to both Whites and
non-Whites. 20 As was previously discussed, 5 1982 guarantees that non-
Whites will have the same right to purchase any type of personal
property as Whites.21 Congress designed 5 1982 to complement 5 1981. 22
23These rights have been construed very broadly by courts. A narrow
construction would be inconsistent with the broad rights articulated.24
The most important idea to take away from any discussion of the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is that the legislators who passed
it realized that if the Thirteenth Amendment was to have practical mean-
ing in our society, non-Whites had to have the same ability as Whites to
purchase personal property and to enter into contractual relations.25 In
short, Congressmen in 1866 realized that an actual, as opposed to a theo-
15. Gen. Bldg. Contractors, Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1982);
See also, Loren Page Ambinder, Dispelling the Myth of Rationality: Racial Discrimination in
Taxicab Service and the Efficacy of Litigation Under 42 US. C. § 1981, 64 GEO.WASH. L. REv.
342,349 (1996).
16. Ambinder, supra note 15, at 350.
17. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 384-85 (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 33 U.S.
24, 32-33 (1948)).
18. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988).
19. Ambinder, supra note 15, at 351.
20. Id.
21. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
22. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 383-84.
23. E.g., Battle v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 399 F Supp. 900,905 (D. Minn. 1975).
24. Id.
25. Brief of Amicus Curiae Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law at 4,
Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 985 F Supp. 1055 (D. Kan. 1997), appeal docketed,
(10th Cir. Dec. 28, 1998) (Nos. 98-3011,98-3261).
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retical, right to purchase property and to enter into contractual relations
was a prerequisite to full citizenship.
B. Building 5 1981 and 5 1982 Cases
Courts have determined the prima facie case in % 1981 and 1982
to be the same: A plaintiff "must allege that he has been deprived of a
right which under similar circumstances, would have been accorded to a
person of a different race."26 To make this showing, a plaintiff must show
"actual and intentional racial discrimination.
2 7
Generally, courts have allowed plaintiffs to prove discrimination in
one of two ways: disparate treatment and disparate impact. To establish a
claim of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show both that she received
less favorable treatment than a White person, and that the defendant pur-
posefully, deliberately, and intentionally treated her differently because of
her race.2 8 A plaintiff establishes a disparate impact claim by showing that
facially neutral actions fall more harshly on one group than another. 29 The
Supreme Court has held that in order to prevail on an action predicated
on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the plaintiff must establish that the de-
fendant's actions rise to the level of intentional discrimination.30 This
interpretation precludes one from bringing a 5 1981 and possibly a
1982 disparate impact claim.'
The framework that the Supreme Court developed in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green32 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine33 for analyzing disparate treatment claims under Title VII also applies
in evaluating disparate treatment claims under § 1981 and § 1982. 34 Un-
der McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing
the prima facie case.35 In the context of § 1981 and 1982, this burden
26. Battle, 399 F Supp. at 905.
27. Ambinder, supra note 15, at 352.
28. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see also
Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. Rv. 1161,1163 (1995).
29. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
30. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 388 (noting that the Thirty-Ninth Con-
gress did not intend to include practices that were neutral on their face).
31. Ambinder, supra note 15, at 352.
32. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
33. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
34. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989)(agreeing with
the application by the Court of Appeals of the framework of proof set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green as it applies to 1981 claims); Lewis v.J.C. Penney Co., 948 F Supp.
367,371 (D. Del. 1996); Ambinder, supra note 15, at 352.
35. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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can be established by showing that "(1) the plaintiff is a member of a
racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the
defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the
activities enumerated in the statute."36 The burden then shifts to the de-
fendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her
actions.37 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant's proffered reason is pretextual and that the real purpose was
discrinnaton. 3 The Supreme Court requires a showing of intentional
discrimination in an action brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866
because it found Congress did not intend for these broad goals to reach
acts that were either neutral on their face or neutral in terms of intent.39
Intent, however, can be inferred from a variety of different circum-
stances. "Factors that may be considered as evidence of discriminatory
intent include: a departure from normal procedures; a history of discrimi-
natory treatment; the specific sequence of events leading up to the
particular action; [and] the administrative history of the action ... . ,40 An_
other relevant circumstance is the disparate impact of an action on a
minority group.4' However, in all but the rarest of cases, disparate impact
is relevant to the question of intent, but is not sufficient.
Now that we are acquainted with the purpose of % 1981 and 1982,
and how one builds a prima facie case under either § 1981 or § 1982, we
can explore how courts have eviscerated the rights under % 1981 and
36. Mian v. Donaldson, Luflin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 E3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir.
1993).
37. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
38. Id. at 804-05.
39. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 388. However, the Supreme Court's re-
quirement of intent in McDonnell Douglas, has been criticized by dissenters and scholars
alike. Some have argued that requiring plaintiffs to prove the defendant's discriminatory
intent under McDonnell Douglas rewrites the statute under which suit has been brought.
Baumann et al., supra note 4, at 232. Justice Marshall's dissent in General Building Contrac-
tors Association, argued that the intent requirement espoused by the Court was
incommensurate with the broad substantive rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 408-09 (Marshal, J., dissenting). The dissent
went on to argue that the majority analysis of legislative intent was particularly flawed
because it failed to account for the fact that the Act was enacted to eradicate the Black
Codes, which consisted of many laws that while neutral on their face, had the purpose of
discriminating against African Americans. Id. at 410 n.2.
40. Ambinder, supra note 15, at 352-53.
41. Id. at 352.
42. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977); Int'l Bhd. ofTeamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,339-40;Ambinder, supra note
15, at 352. One instance in which disparate impact was found to be sufficient included a
defendant who had a total of 13 Black and Spanish-surnamed persons out of 1,828 em-
ployees that filled the same position. Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337. These cases,
deemed rare in 1977 by the Court in Vill. ofArlington Heights, are likely to become even
more rare with potential defendants' increased understanding of civil rights law.
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1982 and made it nearly impossible to build a prima facie % 1981 or
1982 case arising out of marketplace discrimination.
II. PROCEDURE: REVIVING FACT PLEADING TO DEFEND
AGAINST "FRIVOLOUS" CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
In this Part, I explore pleading requirements. I begin by discussing
the history of the Federal Rules of pleading and the purpose of a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. I then document the move toward heightened plead-
ing requirements, the justifications for this move, and the legal legitimacy
of the court's actions. After this discussion, I will explain how heightened
pleading requirements have created a great deal of uncertainty and how
they have created an almost insurmountable barrier for most prospective
5§ 1981 and 1982 plaintiffs. At the conclusion of this Part, I present three
hypothetical cases of discrimination and explore which of these hy-
potheticals would survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a judge imposes
heightened pleading requirements.
A. A History of the Federal Rules Regarding Pleading
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were initially drafted in 193843
by a Judicial Advisory Committee to which Congress had delegated
power through the Rules Enabling Act." The Committee could not alter
any substantive right through the Rules. 4 The Rules are supposed to be
transsubstantive.4 In other words, the procedure defined in the Rules is
supposed to be separate from the substantive law, and it is supposed to
apply in all cases regardless of their substance.47
The Rules clearly define what is required of a defendant in pleading
a cause of action. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that "[a] pleading which sets forth
a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, shall contain ... a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief... ,,48 Rule 9(b) sets
out a few relatively minor exceptions to Rule 8(a)(2) in which more than
"a short and plain statement" are necessary: "In all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated
43. Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 COR-
NELL L. REv. 270, 272 (1989).
44. Eric K.Yamamoto, Efficiencys Threat to the Value ofAccessible Courts for Minorities, 25
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341,385 (1990).
45. Id.
46. See Yamamoto, supra note 44, at 383-84.
47. Baumann et al.,supra note 4, at 214-15.
48. FED. R. Cir. PRO. 8(2)(a).
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with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind
of a person may be averred generally."49 It is particularly important to note
that Rule 9(b) explicitly states that intent may be averred generally.
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created Rule
8(a)(2) to break away from the complex series of fact requirements that
were necessary in pleadings prior to the Rules. 0 The modern view re-
placed complex factual allegations as the purpose of pleadings with
putting the defendant on notice that someone had filed a claim against
him or her."1 The objectives of "notice" pleading are simply to identify
the matter in dispute, and to begin the process so that the matter might
be resolved. 2 This rule means that the plaintiff can plead conclusions, so
long as they provide fair notice to the defendant.
3
This change in the purpose of pleading represented a massive shift in
the law of procedure. As Judge Clark, who was the principal architect of
the Rules, explained when he ruled on a motion challenging the factual
sufficiency of a complaint: "Under the new rules of civil procedure, there
is no pleading requirement of stating 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action; but only that there be 'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ,4 Facts are supposed to be
irrelevant, so long as the allegations adequately put the defendant on no-
tice of the type of action against which he or she must defend.
This change in the purpose of pleadings reflected a broader senti-
ment that cases should be resolved on the merits, not on drawn out
arguments over pleading niceties. 5 These rules are supposed to provide a
cheap and efficient disposition on the merits and avoid costly and time-
consuming arguments over pleading requirements.16 Matters should only
be disposed of on the pleadings in a few limited areas. 7 The Supreme
Court has held that it is only proper to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim, when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to re-
lief."' 8
49. FED. R. CIr. PRO. 9(b) (emphasis added).
50. Marcus, supra note 12, at 433.
51. See id. at 451.
52. See Hamabe, supra note 12, at 125.
53. See Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step For-
ward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677,682 (1984).
54. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (finding plaintiff's claim rea-
sonable and thus remanding claim to the District Court).
55. Marcus, supra note 12, at 440.
56. Yamamoto, supra note 44, at 383.
57. Marcus argues that it is only appropriate to dispose of a matter on the pleadings
when more detail will reveal a fatal defect and when more detail would demonstrate that
the defendant had not violated the plaintiff's rights. Marcus, supra note 12, at 493.
58. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957).
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Practitioners and judges initially resisted the shift from fact pleading
to notice pleading. 9 Suggestions to reintroduce prior pleading regimes
were, however, rebuffed by the Advisory Committee. 60 Judges wedded to
the prior pleading regime attempted to require factual pleading in certain
areas, such as antitrust cases, where district courts often required special
rules of pleading.61 Appellate judges, such as Judge Clark, fended off these
reactionary judges. In hearing an appeal from the dismissal of an antitrust
case, Judge Clark argued that it is impermissible under the Rules for
courts to create special pleading requirements: "In asserting a special rule
of pleading for antitrust cases, our brothers below have in terms rejected
the 'modern 'notice theory' of pleading' as here insufficient... 
,61
The Supreme Court ultimately weighed in decisively on this issue
and upheld the legitimacy of the notice pleading regime created by the
Rules in Conley v. Gibson.63 The Court noted that the sample complaints
attached to the Rules were legally sufficient.64 One of these sample com-
plaints established a negligence count by simply stating that the
"defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was
then crossing said highway"' 6 The Court's decision validated a system
where one only need identify the cause of action and the incident that
66
allegedly gave rise to the cause of action.
B. A History of the Federal Rules Regarding
the 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted created by Rule 12(b)(6) was only designed to be used in
a narrow subset of claims. "Legal, not factual, sufficiency is the only issue
properly challenged through a 12(b)(6) motion. 67 Thus, under modern
pleading, Rule 12(b)(6) cannot be used for "issue narrowing, fact devel-
opment and guidance, and [the] screening of sham or insufficient claims
59. David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REv.
390,416 (1980).
60. Tobias, supra note 43, at 297.
61. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 E2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957) (finding that lower courts
often required "special pleading" in antitrust cases).
62. Id. at 324.
63. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) ("The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he
bases his claim.").
64. Id.
65. FED. R. CIrv. PRO. APP. FoRM 9.
66. Hamabe, supra note 12, at 170.
67. Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous:Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in
Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 935,965 (1990).
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or defenses., 6 Thus,12(b)(6) should be reserved for those situations in
which: (1) the facts, as alleged, demonstrate that the plaintiff is not enti-
tled to relief, (2) the law does not recognize the cause of action identified
in the complaint; (3) the complaint fails to provide adequate notice; or
(4) the complaint does not allege or infer an essential element of a cause
of action.69
Regardless of the clear-cut guidelines established by 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6),
the courts, and the Advisory Committee, fact pleading and dismissal for
stating insufficient facts would enjoy a revival shortly after Conley.
C. The Revival of Fact Pleading in Civil Rights Claims
Fact pleading and dismissals because of"conclusory" allegations have
enjoyed a revival over the past couple of decades. 70 "Although they rarely
acknowledge the shift, federal courts are insisting on detailed factual alle-
gations more and more often, particularly in securities fraud and civil
rights cases.: 71 In fact, it has become commonplace for conclusory allega-
tions to be deemed by courts to be insufficient to state a claim.72 Civil
73rights cases are not the only types of cases disfavored by federal courts.
Nevertheless, civil rights cases were the first, and still favorite, whipping
boy of the federal judiciary.7
In order to get rid of civil rights cases, many courts require the
plaintiff "to plead facts with specificity.75 Often, courts want specific facts
76about the defendant's allegedly discriminatory state of mind. Some
77courts have imposed this requirement on all types of civil rights cases.
The Third Circuit has led the way in instituting heightened pleading re-
68. Hamabe, supra note 12, at 125.
69. Wingate, supra note 53, at 682. For example, when the complaint establishes that
the plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiff is denied relief. Id. at 680.
70. Marcus, supra note 12, at 435.
71. Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 463.
73. Marcus also identifies securities fraud and conspiracy cases as disfavored by the
federal judiciary Id. at 447-50.
74. See Roberts, supra note 59, at 417-20.
75. Blaze, supra note 67, at 939 (quoting Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F2d
920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976)).
76. Marcus, supra note 12, at 466.
77. E.g., Albany Welfare Rights Org. Day Care Center v. Schreck, 463 F2d 620, 623
(2d Cir. 1972) ("Mere conclusory allegations do not provide an adequate basis for the
assertion of a claim for violation of [§ 1983]"); Anderson v. Sixth Jud. Dist. C., 521 F2d
420, 420 (8th Cir. 1975) ("While pleadings in civil rights cases are to be liberally con-
strued ... they must contain more than mere conclusory statements and a prayer for
relief:') (citations omitted); White v. Florida Highway Patrol, 928 F Supp. 1153, 1156
(M.D. Fla. 1996) ("In a civil rights action, more than mere conclusory allegations are re-
quired; a complaint will be dismissed where allegations are vague and conclusory.").
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quirements in all types of civil rights actions] 8 Other courts have targeted
§ 1981 and the rest of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 specifically. 9 Courts
have advanced varying justifications for their actions.
1.Justifications for the Imposition of Heightened Pleading
Requirements in Civil Rights Actions
Some courts have attempted to legitimate their heightened pleading
requirements under the Rules. For instance, the Third Circuit found that
vague and conclusory allegations in a civil rights complaint do not pro-videthedefedan wit far .80
vide the defendant with fair notice. Most courts, however, attempt to
justify heightened pleading requirements on considerations outside of the
Rules.
One of the most frequently advanced rationales for these heightened
pleading requirements is the "litigation explosion." Many federal judges
believe that the courts are experiencing an explosion of cases based on
litigants and lawyers overuse, misuse, and abuse of the civil justice sys-
tem.81 According to adherents of this belief, the explosion began in the
78. Marcus, supra note 12, at 449; see also Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F2d
920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) ("In this circuit, plaintiffi in civil rights cases are required to plead
facts with specificity"); but see, Croswell v. O'Hara, 443 F Supp. 895, 897 (E.D. Pa. 19)
(holding that an allegation that White defendants, had assaulted a Black plaintiff because of
her race was enough to survive a motion to dismiss).
79. E.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 1999) ("To establish a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, plaintiffi must allege facts supporting the following ele-
ments: (1) plaintiffs are members of a racial minority; (2) defendants' intent to discriminate
on the basis of race; and (3) discrimination concerning one of the statute's enumerated
activities.") (citation omitted); Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F2d 646, 649
(9th Cir. 1984) (" 'Conclusionary allegations, unsupported by facts,' will be 'rejected as
insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.' ") (quoting Sherman v.Yakahi, 549
E2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977)); Cohen v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 581 E2d 658, 663 (7th Cir.
1978) ("[A] pleading is insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act if the alle-
gations are mere conclusions.");Yusuf v.Vassar College, 827 F Supp. 952, 955 (S.D.N.Y
1993) (" '[A] complaint consisting of nothing more than naked assertions, and setting
forth no facts upon which a court could find a violation of the Civil Rights Acts, fails to
state a claim under 12(b)(6). ") (quoting Martin v. N.Y. State Dept. of Mental Hygiene,
588 F2d 371,372 (2d Cir. 1978); Henderson v. Montej, No. 89 C 4440, 1989WL 153386
at * 1 (N.D. IlI. 1989) ("A plaintiff seeking to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 must plead facts that would 'support an inference that defendants were motivated
by racial or some other invidious, class based discrimination.' ") (quoting Benskin v. Addi-
son Tp., 635 F Supp. 1014 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
80. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F2d 187, 204 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting and joined by Seitz, C.J., Higginbotham,J., and SloviterJ.J.) (holding that the
Attorney Generally lacked standing to maintain the suit as to the civil rights claims and
that the averments of civil rights violations were conclusory).
81. Tobias, supra note 43, at 287-88.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
late 1960's.82 Courts perceive civil rights claims as being one of the driv-
ing forces behind this litigation explosion.83
The remaining standard justifications for heightened pleading re-
quirements can be attributed to judges' distaste for these claims, which are
disfavored for a variety of reasons."' Some judges begrudge the time these
claims take to litigate, and their complexity.8 Other judges simply disdain
the goals of civil rights litigation. 6 But, the most standard reason for dis-
favoring civil rights litigation is that judges perceive many of these cases
to be frivolous.
87
The case of Bray v. RHT, Inc., 8 best captures the disdain which
judges have for these cases. In Bray, the plaintiff was a Black man who
frequented the defendant's restaurant. During one of his visits there, the
plaintiff was told that he had to leave the restaurant because he had not
ordered anything to drink or eat. 9 The plaintiff alleged that he had been
ordered to leave because of his race in violation of § 1981 and district
tort law.The Federal District Court of D.C. cited several facts that it ap-
parently took to be important in its three paragraph fact section. First,
that the plaintiff was a graduate of Howard University Law School.90 Sec-
ond, the defendant did not use any racial epithets. 91 And, third, the
plaintiff was not told that he could not return to the establishment.92 The
court concluded that the plaintiff had not alleged any facts in support of
his claim and that the facts alleged tended to undermine the plausibility
of his claim.93 The judge grudgingly dismissed the pendent state law
claims as he was required to do by law, but in dismissing the § 1981 claim,
he noted that "it would be sorely wasteful if this frivolous action were
pursued in another forum."94 This "frivolous" case brought by a "litigious"
plaintiff clearly annoyed the judge.
82. Yamamoto, supra note 44, at 350.
83. See infra 125-31 and accompanying text.
84. Marcus, supra note 12, at 471.
85. Yamamoto, supra note 44, at 371-72.
86. Id.
87. Blaze, supra note 67, at 991 (noting that judges disfavor civil rights actions "based
on the explicit assumption that many, if not all, civil rights actions are unfounded.");
United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 E2d 187, 204 (3d Cir. 1980) ("a substantial
number of [civil rights] cases are frivolous or should be litigated in the State courts")
(quotingValley v. Maule, 297 F Supp. 958,960-61 (D. Conn. 1968)); Rotolo v. Borough of
Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976).
88. 748 F. Supp. 3,6 (D.D.C. 1990).
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 6.
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In the end, even if true, these justifications cannot support the use of
heightened pleading requirements in civil rights actions: The Rules Ena-
bling Act, the Rules themselves, and Supreme Court precedent do not
allow for the use of heightened pleading requirements in civil rights
cases.
a. Heightened Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights
Cases Violate the Rules Enabling Act
Even if the courts' rationales for applying a heightened pleading re-
quirement for civil rights claims were all true, it would be improper for
courts to use a heightened pleading standard. Heightened pleading re-
quirements are better understood as substantive law changes than
procedural law reforms. 95 Demanding facts from a would-be civil rights
plaintiff is the equivalent of asking for an offer of proof Such a require-
ment places a burden of production on the plaintiff and shifts the
substantive law "because [the] plaintiff's lack of evidence provides insuffi-
cient assurance that plaintiff in fact has no valid claim against [the]
defendant."96
The Rules were not supposed to have any substantive impact. The
Rules Enabling Act mandated that the Supreme Court and the Advisory
Committee could not enlarge, abridge, or modify any substantive right.97
Thus, judges that have created heightened pleading requirements have
violated the Rules Enabling Act because they have altered substantive
rights through procedural law.
b. Heightened Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights
Cases Violate the Federal Rules
Judges, moreover, have violated the Rules as well as the Rules Ena-
bling Act. Only Congress has the power to modify the Rules and create a
heightened pleading requirement,98 and nothing in the current Rules
supports the imposition of heightened pleading requirements in civil
rights cases. 99 Rule 9 contains all of the instances in which the drafters
95. Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws,
78 NaB. L. Rav. 412,413 (1999).
96. Marcus, supra note 12, at 468.
97. Parness, supra note 95, at 426-27.
98. Nancy J. Bladich, Comment, The Revitalization of Notice Pleading in Civil Rights
Cases, 45 MERCa L. REv. 839,841 (1994).
99. Marcus, supra note 12, at 449 (noting that there is no special provision of the
Federal Rules applicable to civil rights claims); Wingate, supra note 53, at 693 (arguing
that a strict pleading standard is directly contrary to the spirit and purpose of Rule
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wanted greater specificity in the pleadings.'0° Not only does Rule 9 not
provide an exception for civil rights cases, but the Rule's explicit state-
ment that intent and other conditions of mind can be generally averred
undermines any argument that a plaintiff could be required to prove a
discriminatory state of mind under the Rules. 0 ' Interestingly, even if a
court could fit civil rights counts under Rule 9, the Rule requires much
less specificity than courts currently require in civil rights complaints. 1
2
The courts use of heightened pleading requirements also violates
Rule 12(b)(6), in that it turns the motion into a merits issue. Under this
higher standard, courts must weigh evidence when considering a 12(b)(6)
motion. 10 3 "[T]he general requirement of greater factual specificity has
evolved rapidly into a requirement that the plaintiff "satisfy" or convince
the court factually [at a 12(b)(6) hearing] that the claim asserted is not
frivolous.' 1 4 Using 12(b)(6) to weigh the sufficiency of the facts distorts
the rule from its intended purpose of determining legal sufficiency0 5
c. Heightened Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights
Cases Violate Supreme Court Precedent
Finally, heightened pleading requirements are incongruous with Su-
preme Court precedent.The Court in Conley held that under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff does not need to set forth specific
facts to support its general allegations.1 0 6 Heightened pleading require-
ments, which require the plaintiff to set forth specific facts in support of
her general allegations of discrimination, patently violate this Supreme
Court precedent.
1 0 7
8(a))(citing U. S. v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certainteed Prods. Corp., 426 F2d 539 (10th Cir.
1970)).
100. Blaze, supra note 67, at 968-69.
101. Marcus, supra note 12, at 469.
102. Blaze, supra note 67, at 967 (noting that according to the forms appended to the
Rules, a plaintiff meets the particularity requirement for a fraudulent conveyance claim by
stating that, "Defendant C.D. on or about conveyed all his property, to defendant E.F. for
the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff."). The type of particularity required by 9(b) "falls
far short of providing a court with enough facts to assess the validity of the claim as re-
quired under the civil rights pleading requirement." Id.
103. Marcus, supra note 12, at 470.
104. Blaze, supra note 67, at 961.
105. Id. at 963.
106. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957).
107. Hamabe, supra note 12, at 133; Marcus, supra note 12, at 463.
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2.The Arbitrariness of Heightened Pleading Requirements Creates
the Appearance of Unfairness, Undermines the Consistency
of the Law and Makes % 1981 and 1982 Actions
Almost Impossible to Plead
The dissent in Rotolo, which was one of the Third Circuit cases that
required factual allegations in civil rights cases, was troubled that the ma-
jority's decision was influenced by their hostility to the substantive right
at issue. 08 The standards should not vary because an action is disfavored.
Even a proponent of an expanded role for 12(b)(6) motions would have
to be troubled by its ad hoc application to civil rights cases. '0 9
The heightened pleading requirement in claims brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 adds to the inconsistency of the judicial system
and further delegitimates it. Not every court has accepted these height-
ened requirements; the shift to heightened pleading requirements has
been a courtroom-by-courtroom decision."° This piecemeal application
makes it difficult for any plaintiff to know what a particular court will
require, unless the judge presiding over that district court has previously
ruled on this issue. Moreover, even when one knows that a showing of
factual specificity will be required, the question of how many facts will be
sufficient under this nebulous standard is difficult for a plaintiff to deter-
mine.' The obvious answer to this dilemma is to plead as many facts as
possible. But, therein lies the rub.
108. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F2d 920, 925 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, Circuit
Judge, dissenting).
109. Louis, supra note 12, at 1023. Louis favors the early interception of more meritless
or unprovable claims or defenses. See id. at 1033. He notes, however, that "many recent
opinions granting motions to dismiss or for summary judgment are dangerously slanted in
the direction of aggressive interception, ignore or fail to mention the countervailing con-
siderations that formerly commanded the opposite result, and in some cases are alarmingly
redolent of supposedly repudiated Code rhetoric." Id. at 1036. Finally, Louis is troubled by
the fact that courts have arbitrarily chosen actions that they disfavor and subject those
actions to this treatment. See id. at 1037.
110. See supra notes 76-80.
111. Compare Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing 5 1981 and
1983 complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the
complaint did not allege facts to support discrimination), Jones v. Community Redevel-
opment Agency, 733 F2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) ("'Conclusionary allegations,
unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil
Rights Act.'") (alteration in original) (quoting Sherman v.Yakahi, 549 E2d 1287, 1290
(9th Cir. 1977) and White v. Florida Highway Patrol, 928 F Supp. 1153, 1156 (M.D. Fla.
1996) ("In a civil rights action, more than mere conclusory allegations are required; a
complaint will be dismissed where allegations are vague and conclusory."); with Sparrow v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F3d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that heightened
FALL 2001]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
The very nature of claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1982 makes it
difficult for the average plaintiff to have access to many of the facts prior
to discovery. "In civil rights cases, the very facts that the courts require
plaintiffs to set forth in the complaint are often in the exclusive control of
the defendants.', 12 With this standard, courts, in effect, require 55 1981
and 1982 litigants to gather information before discovery Even if a plain-
tiff does engage in a pre-complaint investigation, evidence of
discriminatory intent may be so well concealed that if it could ever be
unearthed, a plaintiff would certainly need the tools of discovery to do
so." 3 Dismissing cases that often involve clandestine wrongdoing before
discovery is, quite simply, unjust. 1 4 One judge summarized this Catch-22
perfectly: "[N]o information until litigation: no litigation without infor-
mation."'.
This system discourages the filing of civil rights complaints."1 6 Plain-
tiffs have pointed out the unfairness of the pleading requirements and
that they cannot possibly meet the requirements before discovery, but
these arguments often fall on deaf ears.17 If courts are going to require
showings of intent and purpose in % 1981 and 1982 actions, these ques-
tions should be resolved after, and not before, discovery."8 Unfortunately,
"heightened pleading requirements make discovery a luxury in most civil
rights cases"" 9 and often end the civil rights case "before it has begun."'
20
pleading requirements violate Rule 8 and can not be used to dispose of cases about which
judges are skeptical), and Cloud v. Community Works, et al., No. 97-1796, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3257 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5774 (Oct. 2, 2000).
112. Blaze, supra note 67, at 962.
113. Marcus, supra note 12, at 468.
114. Louis, supra note 12, at 1038.
115. Baumann et al., supra note 4, at 252 (quoting Johnson ex rel Johnson v. United
States, 788 F2d 845, 856 (2d Cir.) (Pratt,J., dissenting)).
116. Yamamoto, supra note 44, at 372.
117. In Muhammad v. State, No. CIV A. 99-3742, CIV A. 99-2694, 2000 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 15260, at *18 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 2000) the plaintiff, in response to a request to pro-
vide more specific allegations, asked the court for latitude to present evidence obtained
through discovery. The court still dismissed the case because, among other reasons, the
allegations of race discrimination were not supported by fact. Id. at *22. Likewise, in Ha-
rary v. Allstate Insurance Co., 983 F. Supp. 95, 97 (E.D.N.Y 1997), the plaintiff stated that
she could not comply with a request to amend her complaint because she would be un-
able to support her claims with specific facts until she had been allowed discovery. The
court ignored the plaintiff's argument and dismissed the complaint for failure to state
sufficient facts to support her claim. Id. at 99-100.
118. Hamabe, supra note 12, at 177.
119. Bladich, supra note 98, at 843.
120. Id. at 851.
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D. Hypothetical Cases of Discrimination
To explore the effects of heightened pleading requirements, I have
created three hypothetical cases of discrimination. Each of these Hy-
potheticals involve a plaintiff who wishes to bring a civil rights suit
against a seller of goods. All of the Hypotheticals revolve around the same
core set of facts.Your client purchased goods at a number of stores. She
was carrying her bags with her and shopping for additional items at a
department store. While taking some goods she selected up to the cash
register, she was stopped by security guards and searched. The search oc-
curred in the middle of the store in front of a crowd of other shoppers.
Your client believes that she was stopped because of her race: She was one
of the few women of color in the store at that time, and the store did not
stop any of the White customers who were behaving in an identical fash-
ion to herself. In addition, the security officers treated her with absolute
contempt throughout the incident. Dismayed by the events, your client
dropped all the store's merchandise and immediately left the premises.
Each of the three Hypotheticals have minor variations to these core set of
facts.They are as follows:
Hypothetical One (Overt Discriminators): Upon concluding the
search, the security guards informed your client that she was searched
because it was customary at the store to search Blacks who had bags from
other stores and large quantities of merchandise in their hands.
Hypothetical Two (Clandestine Wrongdoing): Unbeknownst to
yourself and your client, the store had an internal training memorandum
instructing security personnel to stop all Blacks carrying bags and large
amounts of store merchandise. In addition, John Doe, who was a former
security guard, was so disgusted by the racist practices of other security
guards that he left the store. If he were to be contacted regarding any law-
suit against the store, he would be more than happy to testify about the
store's practices.
Hypothetical Three (The Unconscious Discriminators/False Posi-
tives):The store's internal training memorandum instructed that a person
is not to be stopped on the basis of race. Nevertheless, an examination of
security incident reports would show that Blacks were not only dispro-
portionately stopped by security offices, but that they constituted an
inordinately large number of people who had been falsely detained on
suspicion of shoplifting.
Despite the fact that all of the plaintiffs had been discriminated
against, only the plaintiff from Hypothetical One would be able to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss in most courtrooms. Barring an extraordinary
bit of luck, none of the other prospective plaintiffi would be able to
gather the facts that would enable them to allege facts in support of their
allegations of discrimination. Without the ability to demand a document
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production, the plaintiff from Hypothetical Two would be required to
depend on the kindness of someone in possession of this smoking gun to
turn it over to her. Likewise, without the ability to request a list of former
employees, the plaintiff from Hypothetical Two would be unable to con-
tact the guard who would be willing to testify on her behalf, and absent
the guard catching word of this suit, he would not contact the plaintiff.
Finally, without the ability to request all of the incident reports from the
last several years, the plaintiff from Hypothetical Three would be unable
to piece together the statistical analysis which could serve as evidence of
discriminatory intent. In short, the three prospective plaintiffs have had
their federal civil rights violated and are left without recourse, and this
result was reached, in part, by the courts' application of supposedly neu-
tral procedural law.
Given heightened pleading requirements blatant disregard for the
letter and spirit of the Rules, it is no wonder that the requirements are
viewed as undermining the law.121 Indeed, some argue that the imposition
of heightened pleading requirements is a sheer act of lawlessness by the
courts. 122 Are the courts at least justified in their lawlessness? That is, are
their proffered reasons for imposing heightened pleading requirements
legitimate? Should we treat % 1981 and 1982 claims as suspicious? In the
end, have courts reached the correct result, by illegitimate means? I turn
to these questions in the next Part.
III. CONTEXT: NEITHER THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD NOR THE
STATE OF RACE IN CONSUMER AMERICA COULD JUSTIFY
HEIGHTENED PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
To answer the questions from the end of the last Part, we must re-
turn to courts' reasons for imposing heightened pleading requirements in
civil rights cases and see if these reasons have any basis in fact. As was dis-
cussed in the previous section, courts attempt to justify heightened
pleading requirements on the basis of "objective" and subjective reasons.
The objective reasons are: (1) The boom in federal court filings requires
that the court take action to preserve the integrity of the judicial system;
and (2) Civil Rights cases are time consuming and difficult to manage.
The subjective reason is that many courts view most, if not all, of civil
121. See Tobias, supra note 43, at 299-300.
122. See Carroll G. Robinson, Johnson v. Jones: The Heightened Pleading Bias, NBA
NAT'L B.A. MAG, Oct. 9, 1995, at 11 ("[I]t could be argued cogently that in disregarding
the Supreme Court's promulgated and Congressional approved Rule 8 by demanding fact
pleading of certain plaintiffs, the subject matter federal courts were acting lawlessly, or
surely beyond their constitutional authority; a matter of no small consequence.") (quoting
Paul McArdle, A Short and Plain Statement:The Significance of Leatherman v.Tarrant County,
72 U. DEr. MERCY L. REv 19,37 (1994)).
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rights claims to be frivolous. I explore the validity of each of these justifi-
cations in turn.
A. The Litigation Boom Justification
Courts commonly claim heightened pleading standards must be im-
plemented to curb the so-called "litigation boom." Many argue that
reports of this litigation boom are more myth than realty.1 23 This myth is
predicated on the increase of federal court filings in the 1960s and
1970s. 124 Marc Galanter studied this increase and found five substantive
fields of law largely accounted for the increase. 12' Galanter identifies pris-
oner petitions and civil rights cases as two of these substantive fields, but
notes that these two account for a relatively small proportion of the over-
all increase in comparison to other substantive fields.1 26 Galanter treats
prisoner petitions as being distinct from civil rights cases.12 7
Both prisoner petitions and civil rights cases share 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983 as a cause of action. Including prisoner suits brought under
§ 1983, one study found that civil rights cases constituted 18% of the to-
tal cases commenced in federal courts the year examined.28 In the 1960s,
civil rights cases accounted for about two percent of the docket. 129 This
surge in civil rights cases, however, can be accounted for, in large part, by
, 130the increase in prisoner suits.
123. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 492.
124. Id. at 441.
125. Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 17
(1986). Galanter argues that "five categories of cases-recovery of overpayments, social
security cases, prisoner petitions, torts, and civil rights cases-account for almost three-
quarters of the entire increase in filings." Id.
126. Galanter states that, "[h]alf of the total increase is accounted for by two giant
increases--recovery cases and social security cases. Each is the result of deliberate and
calculated official policy-to recover overpayments of veterans' benefits by litigation and
to curtail disability benefits by summarily removing beneficiaries from the rolls." Id.
127. See id. at 18 (stating that "[d]isputing about discrimination has a very distinct
profile compared to disputing other matters.").
128. Blaze, supra note 67, at 936.
129. Id.
130. Roberts reports that of the nearly 25,000 civil rights actions brought in the 12
month period ending in June of 1979, 11,783 of these cases were prisoner civil rights
actions. Roberts, supra note 59, at 417-18 n.17; See also Blaze, supra note 67, at 936 ("Ac-
tions brought by prisoners, primarily pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, account in large part
for the dramatic rise in the volume of civil rights litigation."). Interestingly, prisoner suits
have not increased because prisoners have become more litigious; rather, the increase in
prisoner suits can be directly attributed to the increase in the prison population: Prisoner
filings increased by 61%, but the prison population grew 74%. "The number of petitions
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Courts cannot use this increase in the number of civil rights cases
filed to justify the imposition of heightened pleading requirements for
four reasons. First, no value neutral justification, such as the legal com-
plexity of the issues involved, exists for singling out civil rights claims for
special treatment, especially where other fields of law constitute a larger
part of the federal docket.1
31
Second, even if judges were concerned with the growth of civil
rights claims vis-i-vis other substantive fields, it would be wholly irra-
tional to change the pleading requirement for all types of civil rights cases
when we know that the increase in civil rights cases has largely been
driven by the increase in prisoner suits. 3 While prisoner suits and some
civil rights actions might share § 1983 in common, the contested actions
in civil rights cases involving race differ radically from the actions in civil
rights cases involving prison treatment. Treating the two types of actions
the same does not have a strong, practical basis.
Third, judges cannot punish civil rights plaintiffs for filing more
cases when that is what Congress wanted private citizens to do. Congress
intended that citizens use private enforcement of civil rights actions, such
as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, to accomplish the goals of the civil rights133
movement. As we began to integrate in the 1960s and 1970s (which
marked the beginning of the litigation boom), there was greater interra-
cial contact in schools, the workplace, and the market place. With greater
interaction came an increased opportunity for discriminatory behavior:
an employer who has only hired White workers will not be the subject of
a suit alleging disparate racial treatment in the workplace.1 34 As we began
to confront our country's racist history, Congress empowered aggrieved
citizens to act as private attorney generals and remedy many of the harms
they were suffering by passing Acts, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
per 1,000 prisoners actually dropped fiom 73.4 per 1,000 in 1975 to 67.1 per 1,000 in
1984." Galanter, supra note 125, at 18.
131. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Another author who studied this issue
found that during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1987, civil rights cases constituted 18%
of the docket, but contract cases constituted 19% of the docket. Roy L. Brooks, Critical
Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BIACKLErrER
L.J. 85,109-10 (1994).
132. Moreover, courts might be hard pressed to prove that they need special pleading
requirements to get rid of these prisoner suits. One study of the cases in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Arizona found that "defendants never even answer more
than two-thirds of the prisoner civil rights complaints. Few inmate plaintiffi, less than ten
percent, request discovery and even fewer successfiully obtain it." Blaze, supra note 67, at
975.
133. Marcus, supra note 12, at 471-72.
134. Galanter, supra note 125, at 18.
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It would be odd to punish civil rights plaintiffs for enforcing their rights
as Congress had intended.' 3 '
Finally, courts cannot use the litigation boom to justify heightened
pleading requirements because the rationale is pretextual-courts started
to impose heightened pleading requirements before the increase in filings
in federal courts. 13 6 Even if the litigation boom justification were legiti-
mate, it would at best be a post hoc justification for actions undertaken
for other reasons.
B. The Time-Savings /Management Justification
The other objective argument advanced by courts is that these cases
are difficult to manage because they are so time intensive; therefore,
heightened pleading requirements should be used to prevent these cases
from clogging up the court's calendar.While this justification has the feel
of an objective argument that could justify singling out civil rights claims,
it fails to recognize the reality of these claims. Most courts give a civil
rights complainant at least one opportunity to amend her complaint. 137 In
the time spent arguing over whether the complaint has the requisite
specificity and amending it, a plaintiff could have been granted limited
discovery to determine whether the defendant's records help to establish
the existence of intentional discrimination. Heightened pleading re-
quirements do not clear the calendar more quickly than a ruling granting
limited discovery, but they do result in more cases being dismissed.
139
135. In fact, evidence exists that civil rights claims are still being underreported. A
study in the 1980's found that civil rights grievances were, on average, much less likely to
result in litigation than other types of grievances. Galanter, supra note 125, at 19. This un-
der-litigation is most likely due, in part, to difficulties such as the reality that these cases
are often litigated by pro bono attorneys who cannot bear the risk of Rule 11 sanctions in
addition to not having their time compensated.Yamamoto, supra note 44, at 370.
136. See Blaze, supra note 67, at 948 ("In the early 1960's, even prior to the litigation
deluge, courts began to dismiss civil rights complaints for failure to allege specific facts in
support of conclusory allegations ....")
137. Wingate, supra note 53, at 684.
138. Blaze, supra note 67, at 982. Blaze notes that,
applying [heightened pleading requirements] delays, rather than expedites,
resolution and disposition of claims, thereby impeding the efficiency of
other procedures. Courts normally do not dismiss complaints for failure
to meet the [heightened pleading requirements]without affording the
plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Numerous motions, responses and
continued court involvement result.
Id. at 989-90.
139. "The requirement of greater factual specificity is wholly unnecessary and ineffec-
tive in achieving its goal [of reducing the burden on the federal caseload]. The rule is
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C. The Inherently "Frivolous" Rationale
Given that neither the litigation boom nor the timeliness/
management concern can justify heightened pleading requirements, one
must conclude that "the underlying rationale that courts have articulated
[for heightened pleading requirements] remains the same: The vast
majority of civil rights actions are frivolous."4 Courts adhere to this
belief that civil rights claims are largely, if not wholly, frivolous despite the
fact no proof exists that civil rights lawsuits are more frivolous than any
other type of lawsuit.' 4' Because of this belief, courts have improperly
used procedure, rather than the merits, to dispose of these claims. 142 In
disposing of these cases in this matter, courts have run the risk of
dismissing meritorious cases, such as Hypotheticals Two and Three, along
with the "frivolous" cases.
Assuming that judges support the substantive rights articulated in
§ 1981 and 1982, such an attitude can only be justified if the judges be-
lieve that. the number of meritorious claims that cannot meet the
heightened pleading requirements pales in comparison to the number of
frivolous claims. In order to hold this belief that almost all of these cases
are frivolous, a judge would have to believe it is not very likely that these
plaintiffs were the subject of discrimination in the marketplace. The facts
of race in America do not support such a belief.
As ashamed as we might be to admit this, studies have shown that
race impacts most decisionmaking most of the time.14 3 Some scholars
have suggested that racial stereotypes have become part of our cognitive
process.14  The stereotypes our minds create are irrational and quite often
based on illusory correlations. 4 Nonetheless, our minds still use them to
deal with the massive amounts of information we must ingest on a day-
to-day basis. 146 People are unaware of these "short-cuts" their brains have
simply a reflection of a widespread judicial assumption that most, if not all, civil rights
suits lack merit." Id. at 940.
140. Id. at 960.
141. Brooks, supra note 131, at 109-10.
142. Id. at 105-06.
143. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 953, 985 (1993) (discussing social
science literature and studies that indicate the effect of race on White decision-making).
144. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1186-
1217 (1995) (reporting on the work of cognitive scientists who have found that people
use race-based stereotypes to order the massive amount of information around them).
145. Id. at 1195.
146. Id. at 1188.
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adopted, 1 7 so it is fair to say this type of racism is cognitive, and not mo-
tivational, in nature.""
Other scholars have taken a more psychoanalytic approach and ar-
gued that internal defensive mechanisms have repressed our racism.
Under this theory, people's minds deal with their guilt for holding an un-
l 49
popular belief by denying it or refusing to consciously recognize it.
Our culture is saturated with racist beliefs that we cannot help but to in-
ternalize. Despite the fact that racism is all around us, a societal ethic has
developed that it is wrong to be racist.1 50 People deal with this ethic by
repressing their racist beliefs.' But, even when repressed, these racist be-
liefs unconsciously manifest themselves in people's decisionmaking
152
processes.
Whether one finds the cognitive approach or the psychoanalytic ap-
proach more persuasive, evidence abounds that people do not act in
conformity with the values they believe that they hold.
For instance in 1972, 97% of adult White males stated that they be-
lieved Blacks should have as good a chance as White people to get any
kind of job, but surveys and experiments have shown that the number of
Whites refraining from discrimination is not nearly that high.' Audits, in
which researchers paired a White applicant with a nearly identical Black
applicant, showed highly skewed results-White applicants were three
times as likely to be offered a job, and nearly twice as likely to be treated
favorably during the interview 154
This phenomenon is not confined to the employment context.
Studies of both children and adults have demonstrated that by changing
the race of a person in a picture or a video from White to Black, the
White viewer's characterization of that person could change from playful
and friendly to threatening and violent.5 5 Faced with studies such as the
aforementioned, one scholar concluded that "while few whites admit to
holding overtly racist principles, particularly in the area of equal
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1164.
149. Charles R. Lawrence 1II, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning uith Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987).
150. Id. at 335.
151. Id. at 336.
152. Id.
153. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
899, 904-05 (1993) (citing a 1972 study by the National Origin Research Center at the
University of Chicago).
154. Id. at 915.
155. Krieger, supra note 144, at 1202-03.
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employment opportunity, racism remains a potent force in [W]hite
attitudes about African-Americans.,
15 6
In addition to unconscious racism, conscious racism still infects the
marketplace. 157  Blacks are often viewed and treated as potential
shoplifters."" For this reason, stores use their security and surveillance to
target Black shoppers. s9 "In stores across this country, minority shoppers
are under suspicion simply because of the color of their skin."' 60
In addition to targeting Blacks as suspected shoplifters, many White
business owners have problems with Blacks being in their stores. Some
assume that even if the Black shopper will purchase goods instead of steal
them, the Black shopper has probably not earned the money to purchase
the goods honestly.61 This belief that Blacks have not come by their
money honestly, coupled with the belief that Blacks are likely to steal,
leads some to conclude that Blacks "are not worthy to buy in the mar-
ketplace."
1 62
These conscious and unconscious beliefs directly and quantifiably
shape one's experience as a Black shopper. Businesses that treat the Black
consumer poorly run the gamut of the consumer world-retail estab-
lishments, banks, airlines, and movie theatres are just several examples.
163
One of the best documented examples of a quantifiable impact of
discrimination is a study that was done on the different prices offered to
White and Black shoppers by car dealerships. A 1991 study had shown
that "[B]lack male testers were asked to pay more than twice the markup
of [W]hite male testers; and [B]lack female testers were asked to pay more
than three times the markup of [W]hite male testers."1 64 Subsequent re-
searchers attempted to duplicate the result of this 1991 study by sending
156. Oppenheimer, supra note 153, at 915.
157. This Note focuses on the treatment of Blacks in the marketplace. I do not, how-
ever, believe that Blacks are the only group discriminated against in the marketplace.
Instead, my focus reflects the reality that the overwhelming majority of scholars who have
addressed the issue of discrimination in the marketplace have focused on Blacks. Not
surprisingly, however, anecdotal evidence and some scholarly work suggest that discrimi-
nation affects all people of color. See, e.g., Theresa A. Martinez, Embracing the Outlaws:
Deviance at the Intersection of Race, Class, and Gender, 1994 UTAH L. R.Ev. 193 (1994).
158. Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to
Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147,148 (1994).
159. Id. at 152.
160. James L. Fennessy, New Jersey Law and Police Response to the Exclusion of Minority
Patrons fiom Retail Stores Based on the Mere Suspicion of Shoplifting, 9 SErON HALL CONsT. L.J.
549, 549 (1999) (quoting ABC News 20/20: Under Suspicion, Security Guards Unfairly Target
Black Shoppers (ABC television broadcast,June 8, 1998)).
161. Austin, supra note 158, at 151.
162. Martinez, supra note 157, at 195.
163. Austin, supra note 158, at 150.
164. Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of
Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REv. 109,109 (1995).
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pairs of consumers who were nearly identical in every aspect, except for
race, to car dealerships. This second study confirmed that Black male and
female consumers were asked to pay more for new cars than their White
male counterparts. 161 It showed that the initial offer made to Black males
was $962 higher than the initial offer made to White males; the final of-
fer was $1132 higher. 166 This disparity meant that "the initial offer [W]hite
male testers received was lower than the final offer 43.5% of [non-White]
males received.That is, without any negotiating at all 43% of White males
obtained a better offer than their counterparts achieved after bargaining
for an average of forty-five minutes.
1 67
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion of the study was that the
behavior of the car dealers was consistent with the theory that part of the
reason that they offered the higher prices was that they "disproportion-
ately [valued] profits extracted from black males.' ' 168 That is, car dealers
acted, in part, because they derived joy out of sticking Black consumers
with a bad deal.
One can see that a judge cannot be viewed as justified in presuming
that a % 1981 and 1982 suit would be frivolous.We live in a raced soci-
ety, and that racism has infected the marketplace. We have seen that:
Blacks are under surveillance when they shop; Blacks are harassed when
they shop; and Blacks are given the proverbial "bum deal" when they
shop. Despite widely reported anecdotal and empirical evidence that ra-
cism, whether unconscious or conscious, is alive and well in the
marketplace, many judges have stamped §5 1981 and 1982 actions with a
presumption of frivolousness. For whatever reason, many judges seem to
believe that the government has done enough for people of color.
169
IV THE INTERSECTION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW, PROCEDURE,
AND SOCIAL CONTEXT:THE EFFECT OF THE LAW UPON
VICTIMS AND WHERE WE CAN Go FROM HERE
In this Part, I explain how the substantive law, procedure, and social
context interact to make the victim of discrimination feel powerless to
confront the discrimination that surrounds her. I argue that courts must,
once again, be made a forum in which people of color can voice their
complaints. I conclude that this will not happen on a consistent basis
165. Id. at 109-10.
166. Id. at 116.
167. Id. at 119-20.
168. Id. at 132.
169. See Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts about Social Perception and Employment
Discrimination Law:A Modest Proposal for Reopening theJudicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487,
1489-90 (1997).
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until heightened pleading requirements are eliminated by the Supreme
Court. I note that ample precedent exists for this type of ruling from the
Supreme Court. Next, I anticipate counter-arguments that eliminating
heightened pleading requirements will result in an influx of "meritless"
civil rights claims and respond to these arguments. Finally, I conclude this
part by summarizing the importance of returning the discovery process
to civil rights plaintiffs.
A. The Effect of the Substantive Law and the "Procedural" Law of
5 1981 and 1982 on Victims of Discrimination
The substantive law of % 1981 and 1982, coupled with the proce-
dural law surrounding the statutes, conveys two messages to people who
believe that they have been victims of discrimination. First, your griev-
ance will not be remedied unless you can prove that the transgressors
intentionally discriminated against you. And, second, you will not even be
allowed to explore your claim through adjudication, unless you have evi-
dence at the outset that the prospective defendant discriminated against
you because of your race.
The expressive message of the laws has been heard, and the victims
of discrimination in the marketplace do not turn towards the litigation
process to seek justice. A near majority of Blacks feel that even complain-
ing informally about disrespectful treatment in the marketplace is a waste
of time. 170 And, as was discussed above, the number of informal civil rights
grievances that result in fill-blown litigation are disproportionately low."7
The low number of claims of discrimination that actually result in litiga-
tion should not be surprising from an economic standpoint: litigation of
claims brought under §5 1981 and 1982 can be costly and time-
consuming172 Finally, the sheer frequency of incidences when people of
color are discriminated against in the marketplace, results in a feeling of
powerlessness and an attitude that this type of discrimination is somehow
normal.
17 3
Despite all of these disincentives and obstacles in % 1981 and 1982
litigation, claims of discriminatory treatment while shopping are not un-
common.17 Given all of the disincentives to civil rights litigation and all
170. Austin, supra note 158, at 154 n.26. (citing data that 48% of African Americans
surveyed viewed complaining about poor treatment as being a waste of time).
171. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
172. Ambinder, supra note 15, at 347.
173. Id.
174. E.g. Allen v. Columbia Mall, Inc., 47 F Supp. 2d 605 (D. Md. 1999) (alleging that
two African American teenagers were unlawfully detained and searched in the middle of
the mall based on suspicions of shoplifting because of their race); Allen v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., Civ. No. 1:98CV7, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5640 (WD.N.C. March 3, 1999)
(plaintiff claiming that she was stopped in the store's parking lot and asked to return to the
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of the aforementioned studies that show that civil rights claims are under-
litigated, the number of discriminatory-treatment-while-shopping claims
must be viewed as speaking to the pervasiveness of the problem.
B. The Need to Reinstate Courts as Viable Forums for
.5J 1981 and 1982 Litigation
In order to achieve the stated goals of §§ 1981 and 1982, litigation
in this field must be made feasible again.The battle for equality has been a
battle that has been waged predominately in the courtroom. "For people
of color, litigation has always been the most essential governmental re-
source in the protracted struggle for racial equality in America."' 7 Private
litigation against one culpable individual or institution can cause other
rights violators to reassess the propriety and legality of their actions.'
76
The Court's affirmation of the rights articulated in §§ 1981 and 1982 can
give hope to people of color that equality rights are not hollow. Litigation
provides a context for sharing common struggles publicly.' 77This public
forum for the common struggle can serve as a rallying point to make so-
ciety at large aware of a problem and to challenge the status quo.178 Thus,
'79civil rights litigation has the ability to empower subjugated groups.
We need to once again make courts a forum in which people of
color can negotiate about the meaning of public values.' ° In the context
of % 1981 and 1982 claims, this goal means that we must expose and
document the disparate treatment to which people of color, and in par-
ticular Blacks, are subjected when they enter the consumer world.81
Victims must be able to use § 1981 and 1982 to get compensatory and
store for questioning about shoplifting because of her race); Ackerman v. Food-4-Less,
Civ. No. 98-CV-1011, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8813 (E.D. PaJune 9, 1998) (plaintiff claim-
ing that her being physically detained because she was suspected of shoplifting a Spanish
spice powder was racially motivated);Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger Co., No. CIV.A. 96-8262,
1998WL 136522 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 1998) (plaintiffs alleging that they were followed in
a department store and falsely detained on suspicion of shoplifting because of their race);
Hampton v. DUllard Dep't Stores, Inc., 985 F Supp. 1055 (D. Kan. 1997) (plaintiff claiming
that she had been falsely detained by a department store's employee on suspicion of shop-
lifting because of her race); Lewis v. J.C. Penney Co., 948 E Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1996)
(plaintiff claiming that she had been falsely detained for shoplifting because of her race);
Battle v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 399 F Supp. 900, 902 (D. Minn. 1975) (plaintiffs alleging
that they had been falsely detained for shoplifting because of their race).
175. Brooks, supra note 131,at 108.
176. Galanter, supra note 125, at 33.
177. Yamamoto, supra note 44, at 405.
178. Galanter, supra note 125, at 34.
179. Yamamoto, supra note 44, at 404.
180. See id. at 408.
181. See Austin, supra note 158, at 173.
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punitive damages."" Furthermore, % 1981 and 1982 plaintiffs must seek
large damages so that the message can be clearly sent to sellers of goods
and services in the consumer world. 
1 3
To date, these types of cases are few and far between. Two of the bet-
ter documented cases in which large awards were granted for false
accusations of shoplifting based on race are Jackson v. Eddie Bauer, Inc.1
4
and Hampton v. Dilliard Dep't Stores, Inc. 18 In Jackson, the jury awarded one
million dollars in damages when three young Black men were falsely ac-
cused of shoplifting, defamed, detained, and generally mistreated.16 In
Hampton, the plaintiffs received 1,156,000 dollars when a jury found that
they had been falsely accused of shoplifting and detained by a security
guard who had a history of discriminating against Black shoppers .
Until lawsuits, such as the aforementioned, become viewed as ordi-
nary rather than as anomalies, rights violators will continue to engage in
discriminatory practices.Two high-profile incidents illustrate this point. In
anticipation of litigation against taxicab companies in the District of Co-
lumbia area, the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law conducted a study of taxicab practices. This study found that Blacks
were more likely to be passed by than Whites when seeking service and
that it took taxis longer to stop for Blacks."' Despite a high profile set-
tlement, a study done after the suit revealed that the rate at which Blacks
were passed over had actually increased slightly1 89 Sellers of goods and
services need to realize that large damages will likely be the result of dis-
criminatory behavior; as opposed to the status quo, where discriminatory
behavior is very unlikely to result in large damages.
The same story can be told about the stopping of Black motorists
along the Interstate 95 corridor: even after state troopers were told that
they were being monitored because of the radically disproportionate
number of Black drivers who were pulled over, the troopers continued to
stop Blacks at the same alarming rates.190
182. See Ambinder, supra note 15, at 376-77 (discussing the use of 55 1981 and 1982
compensatory and punitive damages to document the discriminatory practices of taxicab
drivers).
183. See id. at 346.
184. JVR No. 209761, 1997WL 802274, (LRPJury October 1997).
185. 18 F Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Kan. 1998).
186. See Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral
Consequences, 40 B.C.L. REv. 717,723 (1999).
187. Hampton, 18 E Supp. 2d at 1261.
188. Ambinder, supra note 15, at 359-60.(citing STANLEY E. RIDLEY ET AL.,TAXI SERVICE
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: IS IT INFLUENCED BY THE PATRONS' RACE AND DESTINA-
TION? (1989)) (detailing report prepared for the Washington Lawyer's Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law).
189. Id. at 363.
190. Russell, supra note 184, at 727.
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C. So Long as Heightened Pleading Requirements Exist, Courts Cannot
Adequately Fu!fill Their Role as Forums For People
Whose Rights Have Been Violated
Unfortunately, the required type of documentation and punishment
will not occur so long as heightened pleading requirements exist for
% 1981 and 1982 actions. Courts must give civil rights litigants the same
opportunity to present the merits of their claims that they give to a neg-
ligence plaintiff, or practically any other type of plaintiff for that matter.191
Eliminating heightened pleading requirements will not bog the federal
docket down with "meritless," civil rights claims. In the end, nothing can
justify withholding discovery from plaintiffs who claim to have had their
civil rights violated.
1.The Supreme Court Should Eliminate Heightened Pleading
Requirements for § 1981 Claims, § 1982 Claims,
and All Other Civil Rights Actions
Given the reticence of several Circuits to do away with these
heightened pleading requirements, the Supreme Court will likely have to
intervene to remedy the problem. This type of intervention is not un-
precedented. In Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
(RICO) cases, district courts and several circuits created various pleading
requirements that did not appear on the face of the statute.192 'The Court
has held that a complaint could not be deemed insufficient for failure to
allege any of these supposed factual requirements. 193 In two cases address-
ing pleading requirements in RICO suits, the Court explained that lower
courts could not create special pleading rules simply because they did not
like the types of claims that were being brought under the statute.194 In-
stead, only Congress can correct supposed shortcomings of the
191. Marcus notes that given the import of civil rights claims, it is questionable for
courts to treat them less favorably:"It would surely be odd to treat the above claims as less
favored than ordinary automobile torts that find their way into federal court due to diver-
sity jurisdiction. Yet auto accident cases are clearly, under Form 9, subject to minimal
scrutiny at the pleading stage." Marcus, supra note 12, at 473.
192. See e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1985)
(reviewing the actions of the Second Circuit, which had instituted rules that a RICO
plaintiff must plead that the defendant had been convicted of the predicate RICO Act
and that the plaintiff had suffered some "RICO-type injury.").
193. Id. at 500.
194. Id. at 499, 500; Am. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, 473 U.S. 606,
608-09 (1985).
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substantive law.'95 In short, the Court held that procedural tools cannot be
used to erode the substantive law.
196
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit9 7 provides another example of the Supreme Court disallowing judi-
cially created pleading requirements.1'" In Leatherman, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that lower courts could not use heightened pleading require-
ments in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions against municipalities, because such
requirements could not be squared with the pleading requirements of
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 9  The Court noted
that Rule 9(b) provided two specific instances in which heightened
pleading requirements would be used and that § 1983 actions alleging
municipal liability do not fall under either one of those specific catego-
200ries.
Unfortunately, although not surprisingly, lower courts have read
Leatherman narrowly. Many courts have simply read the case as invalidat-
ing heightened pleading requirements in § 1983 actions against
municipalities and have not extended its logic to other types of civil
rights cases. 20' Every case requiring heightened pleading requirements in
§ 1981 and 1982 actions, and every other type of civil rights case men-
tioned in this Note, are still good law, even after Leatherman.
It is time for the Supreme Court to speak out clearly and loudly on
this issue.0 2 The Court needs to grant certiorari to a % 1981 or 1982
complaint that has been dismissed because of heightened pleading re-
quirements. The Court should simply apply Leatherman and find that
195. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500.
196. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 460-62.
197. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 168.
200. See id.
201. Brooks, supra note 131, at 106-07. See also, Brown v. Oneonta, 221 E3d 329,340-
41 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing % 1981 and 1983 complaint for failing to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted because the complaint did not allege facts to support dis-
crimination); Muhamnad v. State, No Civ. A. 99-3742, 2000 WL 1511181 (E.D. La. Oct. 6,
2000) (holding that complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because the allegations of discrimination were conclusory and not supported by the facts);
White v. Florida Highway Patrol, 928 F Supp. 1153, 1156 (M.D. Fla. 1996) ("In a civil
rights action, more than mere conclusory allegations are required; a complaint will be
dismissed where allegations are vague and conclusory")
202. The Supreme Court has just granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, No. 00-9010, 2001 WL 246077 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2001).
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3837 at *5 (Sep. 25, 2001). In Swierkiewicz,
the Second Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the district court's decision to
dismiss a complaint because the plaintiff failed to allege "circumstances that give support
to an inference of discrimination." Id. Although it is a Title VII case, the case will give the
Supreme Court an opportunity to review pleading requirements in civil rights actions.
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heightened pleading requirements in any civil rights action cannot be
squared with the plain language of Rule 8(a)(2).
2. Eliminating Heightened Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights
Cases Will Not Open the Floodgates
to Meritless % 1981 and 1982 Claims
Some courts and commentators have argued that eliminating
heightened pleading requirements will open the floodgates of civil rights
litigation and that the federal docket will drown under the deluge of
claims, many of which will be frivolous. These dire predictions seem
more myth than reality, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
equipped to handle any frivolous claims that are filed.
If courts are concerned that a factual examination will not only fail
to bear out the plaintiff's claim, but will also be unduly burdensome to
the defendant, the court can use its broad managerial powers under Rule
16 to have limited discovery into whether the plaintiff will be able to
prove intent. 23 If, after limited discovery, the claim does appear to be
truly frivolous, the matter can be disposed of by a summary judgment
motion brought pursuant to Rule 56. 2 4 The drafters of the Federal Rules
intended that Rule 56 be the primary method of eliminating meritless
claims. 20' Long before courts began to create heightened pleading re-
quirements, the system was already capable of eliminating frivolous
claims. °6
Limited discovery quickly followed by a summary judgment motion
is a more effective and efficient way of handling meritless claims than
heightened pleading requirements-especially when courts routinely
grant a plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend the complaint before
the court dismisses it for deficient pleading. °7
Finally, prospective defendants are not only protected by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Over-worked pro bono organizations represent
2018most civil rights plaintiffs. Given the expense and the time required to
203. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16. Rule 16 gives courts the power to schedule discovery (or to
force the parties to create a mutually agreeable discovery schedule) and to monitor the
progress of discovery through pretrial conferences. "Rule 16 affords federal courts a sig-
nificant degree of authority to control and manage the litigation process. Although this
rule does not provide a direct mechanism for identifying and terminating meridess cases,
properly exercised the rule can meaningfully expedite resolution of cases." Blaze, supra
note 67, at 985-86.
204. Bladich, supra note 98, at 844.
205. Blaze, supra note 67, at 980.
206. Id. at 990.
207. See id. at 982.
208. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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litigate civil rights claims, coupled with the threat of Rule 11 sanctions, it
is unlikely that eliminating heightened pleading requirements will result
in pro bono organizations rushing to federal district courts to file frivo-
lous claims.
3. Giving the Discovery Process Back toVictims
of Discrimination in the Marketplace
We need to give the discovery process back to civil rights plaintiffs.
My focus has been those civil rights plaintiffi bringing suit under 5 1981
and/or § 1982. Even with the onerous intent standards construed into
§ 1981 and 1982 actions, the statutes are not just supposed to protect
against those rights violators who are foolish enough to tell their victims
that they are discriminating against them, as in the overt discrimination
depicted by Hypothetical One.2°9 Courts have interpreted % 1981 and
1982 as proscribing intentional discrimination.Thus, people of color must
be protected against the clandestine, intentional discrimination presented
in Hypothetical Two and must at least be granted discovery on the un-
conscious discrimination depicted in Hypothetical Three. Because our
society no longer openly condones explicit racism, 210 one would think
cases of clandestine discrimination, and not overt discrimination, will be
the paradigmatic cases in the 21' t Century. Courts cannot ignore this real-
ity and eviscerate the protections granted by % 1981 and 1982 by
demanding a showing of discrimination more emblematic of discrimina-
tion that occurred in the 1960s . Under laws that were first enacted in
1866, people of color have the right not to be intentionally discriminated
against when they enter the consumer world. Through procedure, courts
have, in effect, redefined this right so that people of color only have the
right not to be intentionally, overtly discriminated against. In the new mil-
lennium, the only debate in % 1981 and 1982 law should be whether we
want/need to reinterpret the guarantees of the statute to protect against
212the unconscious discrimination depicted in Hypothetical Three. This
209. See supra Part II.D. for Hypotheticals.
210. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
211. In the Title VII context, Krieger notes that courts have erected requirements more
commensurate with the type of discrimination prevalent in an earlier age, and that such
requirements are inadequate for addressing the subtle, and often unconscious, racism of
today. See Krieger, supra note 144, at 1186-1217.
212. As was previously discussed, nothing on the face of § 1981 or § 1982 requires a
showing of intentional discrimination. Justice Marshall spoke quite poignantly on this
matter in his dissent from General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania:
In order to hold that § 1981 requires a showing of intent, the majority
must assume that the rights guaranteed under § 1981-to make and en-
force contracts on the same basis as [W]hite persons--can be adequately
protected by limiting the statute to cases where the aggrieved person can
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procedural argument over whether one can consciously discriminate and
get away with it so long as she is discrete, represents a giant step back-
wards in this country's discourse on race.
CONCLUSION
As we contemplated accepting a settlement offer in our clinic case,
my clinical professor asked me if I was happy with the prospect of settle-
ment. I told her that I was not. When she asked why, I said that I did not
think that the dollar amount adequately accounted for the wrong that
had been perpetrated. I grudgingly agreed, however, that given the weak-
ness of our case after the judge struck the civil rights counts, we should
settle. My professor gave me a sympathetic smile and said clinic students
always think their first case is a million dollar case. I would be remiss if I
denied being swept up in the excitement of my first case, but my prob-
lems with settlement in this particular case were not just those of the law
student working on his first case.
Discriminatory treatment in the marketplace is a painful reminder of
the status of Blacks and other people of color in this country To operate
in this country, one must continually put herself in the marketplace. Each
of these trips is an opportunity to be followed around a store, to be hu-
miliated by sales people, to be accused of shoplifting, and to "inexplicably"
be asked to leave the premises. The drafters of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 realized that we needed to eliminate vestiges of slavery in the mar-
ketplace, if Blacks were to be full citizens of this country213
Recently, support for this principle has waned. The courts use of
heightened pleading requirements, which exist in contravention of the
rules, to silence legal accounts of this discrimination feels like another
violation of civil rights more grievous than the first. Blacks have grown
accustomed to discrimination in the marketplace. 24 The presumption in
prove intentional discrimination. In taking this extraordinarily naive view,
the Court shuts its eyes to reality ignoring the manner in which racial
discrimination most often infects our society.
58 U.S. at 412 (Marshall,J., dissenting).The fact of racial oppression exists regardless of the
discriminator's intent. See Flagg, supra note 143, at 968.The main value of the intent stan-
dard is that it limits the number of actionable cases. See Lawrence, supra note 149, at 324.
Society can then point to the lack of §§ 1981 and 1982 lawsuits as proof of how race
neutral our society has become. Id. at 325. Ironically, this judicially created dearth of suc-
cessful civil rights cases is used by some segments to engender support for anti-affirmative
action initiatives and other programs designed to eliminate, or at least alleviate the effects
of, continuing racism. Id.
213. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
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many federal district courts across this country that the claims of dis-
crimination in the marketplace are frivolous, however, is a blow from an
institution which is supposed to protect the rights of minorities.
Courts must do better for those people of color who are brave
enough and committed enough to stand up to the discrimination that
most people of color just grin and bear. I am not arguing that the courts
should offer special treatment to % 1981 and 1982 plaintiffs. I only ask
that §5 1981 and 1982 plaintiffs be given the same opportunity to litigate
their claims that virtually all other plaintiffs are given. If the playing field
is simply leveled, I have every confidence that the plight of people of
color, and in particular Blacks, in the marketplace will finally be docu-
mented-and hopefully remedied.
